Originally this was going to be a comment on Q's last post, but it was getting out of hand, so I'll burden you all with it right up front:
Q, I agree with you that, if there is a distinction between Anzeichen and Bezeichnen, than it is not a primary one, for certainly Husserl is concerned in the first instance to firmly establish the distinction between Anzeichen and Expression as two different but related kinds of Signs. Now, I'm going to be boring and say that we're both half right--or rather, that you're right, there are ( I think) Anzeige that do not bezeichnen, but that all the Anzeige that H. is really concerned with actually do bezeichnen, and that the rest of the first chapter bears this out along the way to (at least in a preliminary fashion) distinguishing Indicators (an-) and Expressions.
Firstly, I think you're right in the main that the canals on Mars, say, do not really "designate", "denote" or "stand for" a Martian civilization, but I don't think that the essential distinction is between arbitrary and non-arbitrary signs. As H. says, "these and similar distinctions [between Martian canals, knots in handkerchiefs, and brandings] do not destroy the essential unity of the concept of 'Anzeichen.'" It's essential characteristic is that the existence of the indicator suggests the existence of the indicated. There are many kinds of indicators, some arbitrary, some not. Thus, while in sec. 2 an important example of Bezeichnen is marking with chalk, in sec. 16, H. can say that "the robber's chalk mark is a mere Anzeichen (a marking)."
Arbitrary or not, none of them operate according to logical necessity: they point to things (Hinweis) without demonstrating them (Beweis). They are all within the domain of Association (here H. is in agreement with Hume, as sec. 4 shows). I don't think Hume would say that smoke is an arbitrary sign for fire, but only that it does entail with logical necessity the existence of fire, and there H. is in complete agreement. In fact, for H., anything that points to something else non-logically is an Anzeige. Wide net indeed.
Now, stepping gingerly over the fresh horse carcass, one or two comments on Anzeichen and Meaning of Bedeutung, the distinction H. is really after. Supported by the passages I quote below, I think one can very roughly but not entirely inaccurately say the following. All fully communicative speech (between at least two people) consists of Meanings (Bedeutungen) and Anzeichen, and that latter in two respects. First (1) as a sign of what the speaker means (my saying "It's raining" is a sign of my thinking that it's raining, or designates me as one who thinks that it's raining--this is what H. calls Kundgabe (enunciation?); second (2) the expression points to or designates (by means of its Meaning) a certain object or range of objects (in Anya's example, 'the cat is on the mat' points to/designates/names a cat, and says that it's on the mat). It is especially the second kind of Anzeichen (which definitely 'bezeichnets') that requires Bedeutung, whose operations H. is trying to explain in the first place.
I hope this -zag in the conversations hasn't been entirely wrongheaded. If it is, please set my aright.
Those quotes:
sec. 5. "we distinguish from indicative signs (anzeigenden Zeichen) the meaning ones, expressions."
sec. 7: "...all expressions in communicative speak serve as indicators (Anzeichen). They serve the hearer as signs (Zeichen) for the "thoughts" of the speaker."
sec. 11: Kundgabe (manifestation, enunciation) of my psychic act; but an expression of its meaning
sec. 12 - the expression says something, and speaks about something
sec. 13: "the expression (Ausdruck) designates [bezeichnet] (names) by means of its meaning (Bedeutung)."
sec. 16: mitbezeichnen (Mill's "connotation"): "such names as denote/designate (bezeichnen) a subject and contain in themselves an attribute; ... non-connotative names [are] such as denote a subject without ... indicating (anzuzeigen) an attribute as adhering to it"
"The robber's chalk mark is a mere Anzeichen (marking), the proper name an expression. // Like any expression at all, the proper name works in its enunciatory (manifesting? kundgebenden) function as an Anzeichen." (sec. 16)
Sorry about the bigger font. I have no idea how that happened, or how to change it back.
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ReplyDeleteI have a minor supplement with the way you divided the Anzeichen into two aspects. But much of the first investigation has escaped my memory so I'll just develop my own view here regardless of what Husserl actually thinks. "It's raining" and "I think it's raining" are two different expressions: the former points to the matter of fact (that it's raining) while the latter points to the speaker's mental state (the speaker's judgment). Now I add in the listener's response to complicate a bit. "It's raining" as perceived by the listener can elicit two ways of taking it. First, the natural way: I look at the sky and say, "ah, indeed it is" or "yeah, isn't it bad?" I don't really think that "oh, so she thinks it's raining;" my attention is not on her mental state. Second, I might look at the sky and find out it's in fact sunny - and this is where I disregard the expression "it's raining" and the meaning it expresses, and start to look for explanations "behind" the expression. Is she out of her mind? Is she being purposefully enigmatic? Or is she a philosopher who's being ironic about sense perception? This is where "It's raining" takes on the aspect of "being a sign of the speaker's mental state" as you mentioned, but now it loses the aspect of expressing the content/meaning/sense of the sentence. I add this note because I think Husserl's note on natural attitudes and phenomenological reflection in the preface is immensely important and this example seems to clarify a bit what he's trying to get at in some concrete (but still elusive for me) way.
ReplyDeleteMy further perplexity after reading your post is this: what about facial expressions? Is a laugh a sign for being jolly? Or is the jolliness "in" the laughing and we just immediately "see" it rather than infer it from the laughter, or associate the laughter with it? (If Husserl thinks it as a sign, then he's back to the Cartesian way again, and Heidegger's critique about Husserl not radical enough to suspend the mind-body dichotomy seems absolutely right to me.)
I'm not sure about facial expressions, and that's a very interesting question. But about "It's raining" and "I think it's raining", it's true that the first does not "mean" or "intend" my mental state; it "intends" that it's raining, but it is a sign of my mental state, that I believe it's raining (see. sec. 11). The second is trickier, as it could be taken in several ways. First as a mere enunciation of my belief, in which case it would "intend" my mental state, but perhaps more plausibly as a qualified statement about an external state of affairs ("it's raining outside, or at least I think so") which would require a more complicated analysis
ReplyDeleteWhat's important, though, at least in the first chapter of the first investigation, is that an expression can serve as a Sign (Zeichen) in various ways, but can only mean or intend (bedeuten, intendieren) in one.
Husserl definitely things laughing is a sign as I say in my post. The laughing indicates my happiness (jollity?). The happiness isn't in the laughter, that would be more Merleau-Pontian.
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